Religion and State Formation in South and Southeast Asia

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Abstract

Why did some Islamic movements gain a foothold in new states but not others? In Pakistan, the traditionalist movement, Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam, shaped constitutional debates and played a crucial role in writing foundational documents, while the modernist organization, Jamaat-i-Islami, faced arrest and exclusion. In Indonesia, Muhammadiyah achieved greater integration with the state, whereas Persatuan Islam remained marginalized, despite both movements sharing modernist theological commitments and robust educational networks. These patterns contradict explanations that emphasize theological orientation, organizational capacity, or colonial institutional legacies as determinants of a movement's ability to integrate with the state. Through comparative historical analysis of primary sources, including archival records, movement publications, and government documents, I demonstrate that Islamic movements' doctrinal positions on territorial nationalism during anti-colonial struggles determined their integration into postcolonial states. Movements that developed doctrinal interpretations reconciling Islamic principles with territorial nationalist goals forged alliances with secular elites that translated into institutional, symbolic, and mobilizational integration after independence. Movements maintaining doctrinal opposition to territorial nationalism remained excluded and unable to overcome this marginalization despite subsequent strategic adaptation. This reveals how founding-era doctrinal positions created path-dependent lock-in effects. This paper contributes to our understanding of postcolonial state formation by showing how Islamic movements became not external actors seeking influence but constitutive co-creators of state identity, institutions, and legitimacy, and how doctrinal specificity during critical junctures proved more consequential than broader theological orientation, organizational strength, or material resources in determining long-term religion-state relations.

In Pakistan, two major Islamic movements, namely, Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI) and Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), operated extensive organizational networks and mobilized significant followings during the 1940s independence struggle (Talbot, 1998). Yet their trajectories diverged significantly. JUI became a constitutional co-architect, shaping foundational documents and co-authoring foundational documents. JI faced arrest and systematic exclusion despite comparable organizational capacity (Nasr, 1996). Indonesia reveals a parallel pattern. Muhammadiyah and Persatuan Islam (Islamic Union—Persis) both championed modernist Islamic reform, operated extensive educational networks, and emphasized direct engagement with the Quran. Yet Muhammadiyah achieved quasi-governmental status; for instance, 23 of Indonesia's 206 National Heroes emerged from its ranks (Persyarikatan Muhammadiyah, 2024), while Persis remained structurally excluded despite individual members reaching high office .

These divergent outcomes contradict existing explanations such as theological orientation, organizational capacity, and colonial institutional legacy arguments. In this paper, I ask: why did some Islamic movements become institutional co-architects of newly independent states while others remained excluded from foundational state-building?

I develop a theory of the integration of Islamic movements into postcolonial Muslim-majority states during the founding moments, when territorial nationalism was contested, and state institutions were constructed rather than inherited. The question of territorial nationalism manifested differently across contexts. In colonial India, the Muslim League's two-nation theory demanded that Islamic movements take positions on territorial separation (Devji, 2013) and whether they would subordinate transnational *ummah* unity to support a territorially defined nation-state. In Indonesia, territoriality concerns the unification of the vast archipelago (Kahin, 1952), with movements deciding whether to prioritize Indonesia's territorial integrity over transnational Islamic unity or local ethnic identities. Though specific territorial questions differed, Islamic movements' doctrinal positions on whether territorial nationalism could be reconciled with Islamic principles proved decisive for state integration.

I argue that the doctrinal positions of Islamic movements on territorial nationalism during anti-colonial struggles shaped their integration into postcolonial states. Movements that reconciled Islamic principles with territorial nationalist goals forged alliances with secular elites that translated into institutional co-creation after independence. Movements that opposed territorial nationalism remained excluded despite subsequent adaptation, revealing religious and

political lock-in effects that prevented doctrinal revision. Through a controlled comparison of four Islamic movements and a comparative historical analysis of archival records, movement publications, and government documents, I trace causal mechanisms linking doctrinal positions to state integration. JUI in Pakistan and Muhammadiyah in Indonesia developed doctrinal interpretations compatible with territorial nationalism and became deeply embedded in state institutions. JI and Persis maintained doctrinal opposition to territorial nationalism and remained excluded despite similar theological orientations and comparable organizational capacity.

Understanding this variation matters for the following reasons. First, it challenges conventional wisdom about religion and state formation. Where bellicist theories emphasize war-making and secularization narratives predict religious marginalization, postcolonial cases reveal Islamic movements as constitutive state-builders, but selectively. In Pakistan and Indonesia, Islamic movements co-created institutional architectures and constitutional frameworks during formative moments when state structures were being established rather than inherited. Second, initial integration patterns proved remarkably durable. JUI's constitutional influence persisted across multiple Pakistani constitutions; Muhammadiyah's educational authority survived Indonesia's transitions from parliamentary democracy to Suharto's authoritarianism and to contemporary democracy. Excluded movements resorted to confrontational politics and parallel institution-building, thereby fragmenting state capacity.

Conceptual Framework: Doctrinal Positions and State Integration

In this paper, I study Islamic movements as religious actors united by a shared doctrine that shapes their politics (Wiktorowicz, 2004; Schwedler, 2006). Through formal and informal ways, these movements attempt to influence public policy and the state. Scholars distinguish movements as modernist or traditionalist (Esposito & Voll, 1996; Purohit, 2023; Roy, 1994), but I distinguish them based on their positions on territorial nationalism. Theological orientations of movements are broader stances on religion's relationship to political authority and differ from doctrinal positions (Bayat, 2007; Grzymala-Busse, 2016; March, 2015). For instance, JUI and Jamaat-i-Islami both trace institutional origins to the Deobandi tradition (Metcalf, 1982; Zaman, 2002) and both advocate for Islamic governance, yet they diverged completely on nationalism's compatibility with Islam. This is the divergence that shared theological lineage cannot explain. In Indonesia, Muhammadiyah and Persis are both considered modernist-reformist movements that

emphasize direct engagement with the Quran (Federspiel, 2001; Noer, 1960), yet they adopted opposite stances on Indonesian territorial nationalism.

Doctrinal positions represent movements' specific applications of religious principles to concrete political questions (Grzymala-Busse, 2015), not their general theological worldviews. This is to say that doctrinal position on territorial nationalism refers to Islamic movements' authoritative interpretations of whether Islamic principles accommodate political organization around territorial boundaries. During anti-colonial struggles, movements faced a fundamental theological-political choice: could Muslims legitimately organize around territorial nation-states (Aydin, 2017), such as Pakistan or Indonesia, or did Islamic principles require prioritizing the transnational ummah over territorial divisions? Movements articulated these positions through religious rulings (fatwas), leadership pronouncements, and theological treatises that provided religious justification for either cooperation with or opposition to nationalist projects.

These doctrinal positions operated as distinctively religious mechanisms in three ways. First, religious authority created binding obligations on followers that secular political endorsements did not (Asad, 1986). Second, doctrinal pronouncements on fundamental theological questions proved harder to reverse than secular policy positions, which created lock-in effects through religious authority structures (Kalyvas, 1996). Third, only movements with established religious credentials could provide the theological legitimation that secular nationalist elites needed to counter claims that territorial nation-states contradicted Islamic universalism.

My outcome of interest is state integration during the formative period of state-building (Evans et al., 1985), which I conceptualize as operating through three dimensions: institutional integration encompasses movements' formal positions within state bodies, constitutional authority, and recognized control over policy domains such as education and religious affairs. The indicators include appointments to constituent assemblies or constitutional committees; ministerial or advisory positions; recognized authority over policy domains (education, religious affairs); and official status in state institutions. These indicators capture 'state infrastructural power (Soifer, 2008). Symbolic integration encompasses movements' acknowledged contributions to national identity, their recognition as legitimate national representatives, and their inclusion in official founding narratives. The indicators include official state recognition of independence contributions, representation in national commemorations and founding narratives,

state use of movement leaders as religious spokespersons, and national hero designations. Finally, mobilizational integration involves organizing political action through state-recognized rather than oppositional channels, including participation in state-sanctioned parties and use of institutional rather than confrontational tactics. The indicators are participation in state-sanctioned political parties or coalitions, mobilization of supporters for state initiatives rather than against them, use of state institutions (parliament, courts), and collaborative rather than confrontational relationships with state authorities.

Religion and Postcolonial State Formation: Existing Approaches

I engage with two distinct literatures: scholarship on state responses to Islamist movements, and comparative theories of postcolonial state formation.

a) State Responses to Religious Movements: Inclusion, Exclusion, and Their Origins

A substantial literature examines how states respond to Islamist movements, yet it has overwhelmingly focused on the effects of inclusion rather than its origins. The central argument of the inclusion-moderation debate holds that incorporating opposition actors into formal political processes moderates them (Schwedler, 2006; Wickham, 2004), whereas exclusion radicalizes them (Hafez, 2003). However, recent scholarship has complicated both claims: moderation has been shown to produce radicalization (Bashirov & Lancaster, 2018; Brocker & Künkler, 2013), and exclusion has been shown to produce moderation (al-Anani, 2016; Cavatorta & Merone, 2013; Grewal, 2020). The literature thus treats inclusion and exclusion as starting points rather than asking what determined them, and this is the question this paper addresses.

Moreover, existing scholarship on the Islamic movements generate predictions about their politics but cannot account for the variation observed within and across the cases examined here. Theological differentiation theories (Esposito & Voll, 1996; Purohit, 2023; Roy, 1994) argue that modernist movements tend to capture the state to impose their agenda, yet traditionalist JUI achieved deep constitutional integration while modernist JI faced systematic exclusion in Pakistan, and both Indonesian cases were modernist reformists whose integration diverged sharply. Organizational capacity theories (McCarthy & Zald, 1977) predict that movements with superior infrastructure should gain state access more readily, yet JI's disciplined cadre structure did not produce embeddedness while JUI's madrasa networks did. Colonial

legacy arguments (Kohli, 2004; Migdal, 1988) predict that movements operating within identical colonial contexts should follow similar trajectories, yet the dramatic within-country variation directly contradicts this. Staniland (2021) offers the most productive adjacent engagement: governments' ideological projects, rooted in the history of carrier movements, drive threat perceptions that determine whether states pursue alliances or repression against nonstate actors. The argument travels directly into the cases here. Yet armed orders were theorized for groups operating in contexts of ongoing or potential violence, not religious organizations competing for institutional access at founding moments. More fundamentally, Staniland takes ideological projects as his starting point; this paper asks how those projects were themselves constituted through the doctrinal choices of religious movements during anti-colonial struggles. The state's responses were not exogenous; rather, they reflected alliances and antagonisms that movements had actively shaped.

b) Religious Movements and Postcolonial State Formation: A Bottom-Up Process

Classical state formation theories emphasize material causes, arguing that war-making, extraction, and coercion are the engines of state construction (Tilly, 1975, 1985). Subsequent scholarship has challenged the framework's universal applicability (Kurtz, 2013; Mazzuca, 2021; Slater, 2010), and recent work recovers religion's centrality even to European state formation (Blaydes, 2017; Grzymala-Busse, 2023; Philpott, 2007, 2009). Yet we still lack a systematic account of how religious movements become institutional co-architects in postcolonial contexts. The cases examined here reveal a constitutive bottom-up process that this literature has underspecified. Islamic movements in Pakistan and Indonesia did not merely respond to structures secular elites had already built; they participated in constructing those structures during formative moments when institutions were being created rather than inherited. Unlike in Europe where churches leveraged moral authority to influence policy within existing states (Grzymala-Busse, 2015); the postcolonial cases tell a different story. Religious movements here were not external actors seeking influence; they were co-authors of the state itself, embedding doctrinal commitments in constitutional frameworks that outlasted any particular government.

Argument: Doctrinal Positions on Territorial Nationalism and State Integration

When do religious movements become co-architects of new states rather than external challengers? During founding moments, religious movements face a fundamental dilemma: they must reconcile universal theological claims with particularistic nationalist projects. I argue that movements which develop doctrinal solutions to this tension, authoritative interpretations framing territorial nationalism as religiously permissible, gain unique leverage. Unlike secular organizations, they can bind followers through sacred authority and provide nationalist elites with religious legitimation, thereby converting strategic cooperation into a moral obligation. This generates a three-stage mechanism: doctrinal compatibility enables movements to justify cooperation to followers, this justification makes movements valuable to nationalist elites seeking mass mobilization, and alliances formed during independence translate into institutional access during state formation. This mechanism operates only under specific scope conditions: contested territorial boundaries, movements with organizational capacity, and critical junctures when institutions are being created rather than inherited.

Furthermore, doctrinal compatibility created conditions for engagement with secular nationalist elites, which in turn led to political alliances that produced durable consequences for movement-state integration (Kalyvas, 1996, 2000). At moments when movements interpreted Islamic principles as compatible with secular nationalist goals, they were able to forge working relationships with those elites that in the post-independence era translated into privileged access to state institutions. On the other hand, movements that held incompatible interpretations of Islamic principles regarding nationalism were unable to forge such alliances. These movements offered no political utility to the state (Anderson, 1991): they could neither provide religious legitimacy for nationalist projects nor persuade their followers to participate in what they had previously deemed un-Islamic political enterprises. In either case, these alliances were central to determining which movement would successfully attain integration with the state.

As Table 1 shows, there are three sequential processes through which the causal connection between doctrinal positions and state integration operates. The first challenge was to persuade the movements' followers to cooperate with nationalist elites and to clarify that the struggle for independence against colonial rule was Islamic rather than a betrayal of their faith. These internal justifications, given compatible doctrinal positions, conferred religious legitimacy on political engagement that would otherwise be seen as corrupting worldly involvement (Enayat, 1982; Jalal, 2000). After securing internal legitimacy, movement leaders convinced

nationalist elites that their organizations were reliable partners rather than potential ideological threats. Despite maintaining a boundary between religious and political authority, these movements demonstrated their capacity to provide religious validation for the nationalist projects desired by secular elites. In the post-independence formative phase, these movements, which had secured internal justification and offered legitimacy to the nationalist projects, were granted privileged access to the state's foundational policies, including constitutional deliberations.

Table 1: Mechanisms of State Integration for Islamic Movements

Doctrinal Position on Territorial Nationalism	**Independence Struggle Participation**	**Institutional Dimension**	**Symbolic Dimension**	**Mobilizational Dimension**	**State Integration Outcome**
Compatible	Supportive alliance with nationalist movements	High access to formal state positions and constitutional processes	Strong recognition as a contributor to national identity	Effective mobilization through state-recognized channels	High
Mixed/Limited Compatibility	Selective engagement with the nationalist	Partial access to state institutions; individual rather than organizational representation	Moderate recognition in national narratives	Limited mobilization capacity within state frameworks	Medium
Incompatible	Opposition to territorial nationalism	Exclusion from state structures and decision-making processes	Marginalization in national identity narratives	Confrontational tactics and limited state-sanctioned mobilization	Low

The mechanism operates through two distinct micro-level processes that differentiate religious authority from secular ideology. First, for movement followers, religious authority creates binding obligations unavailable to secular organizations. When movements issue authoritative interpretations (fatwas, religious rulings) declaring nationalism compatible with Islam, followers who accept that authority face religious, not merely strategic, reasons for compliance: divine approval of political action, social sanctions within religious communities for non-compliance, and resolution of cognitive dissonance between religious identity and nationalist engagement

(Zaman, 2002). Conversely, when movements declare nationalism un-Islamic, followers face religious prohibitions that strategic appeals from nationalist elites cannot override. Second, for nationalist elites, movements with compatible doctrines become valuable partners because they: mobilize followers through existing religious networks (mosques, madrasas, publications); provide theological legitimation that counters rival religious interpretations; and signal credible commitment through costly doctrinal pronouncements that cannot be easily reversed. Movements with incompatible doctrines offer none of these benefits. Even if they later moderate positions, their documented historical opposition remains exploitable by rival movements already embedded in state structures.

This creates two lock-in effects that explain the durability of initial integration patterns. Social lock-in binds movements to founding doctrinal positions because revision undermines religious legitimacy and organizational identity, risking member defection and loss of credibility among core constituencies. Political lock-in reinforces these constraints by creating competitive disadvantages: movements seeking doctrinal revision face accusations of opportunism from rival organizations already embedded within the state, while their historical opposition to nationalism remains documented in colonial archives and movement publications (Gill, 1998). JI's periodic attempts to moderate its anti-nationalist rhetoric illustrate these constraints. As the cases discussed below reveal, even strategic shifts could not overcome the institutional advantages JUI secured through its original accommodation of Pakistani nationalism, because the state continued to privilege movements whose nationalist credentials were established during the independence struggle rather than adopted retroactively.

A key implication is that the integration of religious movements into the state apparatus is that unlike in churches in Europe that leveraged moral authority to influence policy within existing states (Grzymala-Busse, 2015), religious movements in these postcolonial cases were co-architects of the state itself. This temporal focus also distinguishes the argument from adjacent work. Philpott (2007) asks whether religious principles permit engagement with secular authority; this paper asks the prior and more consequential question of whether they accommodate territorial nationalism during the founding moment itself and extend the debate.

The argument generates clear falsification conditions. Most directly: if JI had secured constituent assembly positions during Pakistan's formative decade (1947–1956) despite its anti-nationalist doctrine, or if Persis had achieved organizational recognition comparable to Muhammadiyah, these outcomes would disconfirm the argument. If excluded movements subsequently overcame structural disadvantages through doctrinal revision, the path-dependence claim would require reconsidering.

Research Design: Paired Comparison of Islamic Movements

In Indonesia, I selected Muhammadiyah (1912) and Persis (1923), both of which share a modernist orientation. On the other hand, Jamaat-i-Islami (founded 1941) in Pakistan is a revivalist and modernist Islamic movement, whereas Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (1945), which split from its original movement, Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind, is a traditionalist movement.

I employ a controlled comparison to examine how doctrinal positions on territorial nationalism shaped the integration of Islamic movements into postcolonial states (Lijphart, 1971). Pakistan and Indonesia provide a theoretically productive comparison: both are Muslim-majority countries that achieved independence from European colonial powers in the mid-20th century (Pakistan 1947, Indonesia 1945-1949), experienced subsequent authoritarian rule interspersed with democratic periods, and faced fundamental questions about territorial nationalism during independence. Pakistan's emergence required doctrinal positions on territorial separation from Hindu-majority India; Indonesia's unification required positions on whether archipelagic nationalism could be reconciled with transnational Islamic identity or local ethnic particularisms. These similarities allow the research design to hold constant the Muslim-majority population, colonial experience, timing of independence, and salience of territorial questions during state formation.

Moreover, within each country, I compare movements that share theological orientation, organizational capacity, and colonial context yet achieve divergent integration outcomes. In Pakistan, both the JUI and the JI trace institutional origins to the Deobandi tradition, though JI's founder Maududi developed a distinct modernist-revivalist ideology that diverged sharply from JUI's traditionalist Deobandi orientation, a divergence that itself illustrates why shared theological lineage cannot explain differential integration outcomes. Even Maulana Shabbir

Ahmad Usmani's own Deobandi contemporaries found his political theology controversial. For instance, his application of Hanafi jurisprudence to the question of Pakistani nationalism was a creative departure from received tradition that provoked significant internal debate within Deobandi circles (Hameed, 2024). In Indonesia, both Muhammadiyah and Persis are modernist Islamic reform movements that oppose syncretic practices, advocate a direct return to the Quran and Hadith, emphasize ijtihad over taqlid, and operate modern educational institutions that disseminate reformist publications. Yet Muhammadiyah achieved high integration while Persis achieved only individual-level influence without organizational recognition.

This within-country variation, while holding theology, organization, and context constant, provides strong analytical leverage. None of the standard alternative explanations predicts the observed pattern in my cases. The case of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) further corroborates the argument. As Indonesia's largest traditionalist movement, NU accommodated territorial nationalism through its Resolusi Jihad of October 1945, which declared armed resistance against Dutch forces a collective religious obligation, and subsequently achieved deep institutional integration. That NU and JUI, both traditionalists, integrated successfully, while JI and Persis did not, confirms that theological orientation alone determines nothing. Doctrinal position on territorial nationalism does. The incompatible end of the spectrum is illustrated with equal clarity by the fate of the Darul Islam movement. Led by Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwiryo, Darul Islam rejected Indonesian territorial nationalism in favor of an Islamic state and launched an armed rebellion against the Republic in 1948, refusing to recognize the authority of the secular nationalist government. The state's response was unambiguous: sustained military suppression culminating in Kartosuwiryo's capture and execution in 1962 (Formichi, 2012; Matesan, 2020).

The case selection addresses concerns about generalizability through what Slater and Ziblatt (2013) term "representative variation", selecting cases representing broader patterns observable across postcolonial Muslim-majority contexts. The mechanisms identified here, doctrinal compatibility that enables alliance-building and, in turn, institutional access, appear in other Muslim-majority independence movements in which territorial nationalism was contested. However, I do not claim that these mechanisms operate universally across all religious movements or state-formation contexts. Three scope conditions delimit the theoretical domain: contested territorial boundaries during decolonization, movements with sufficient organizational

capacity, and critical junctures of institutional creation. Whether similar mechanisms operate among non-Islamic religious movements in comparable contexts, or whether they apply to religious movements that emerged after state formation, requires systematic investigation beyond the scope of this study. As discussed in the conceptual framework, these mechanisms operate distinctively through religious authority structures that create binding obligations, irreversibility costs, and legitimation capacities unavailable to secular organizations.

Islamic Movements in Colonial India

British India underwent massive political and religious transformations in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. With the consolidation of colonial rule, Muslims, who happened to be a religious minority, started finding themselves navigating challenging questions about religious identity, political representation, and their future in an increasingly Hindu-majority polity (Zaidi, 2021). The collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924 proved a catalyst for religious mobilization in South Asia, as it apparently marked the decline of Islamic political power. Various Islamic movements emerged in this context, each with competing visions for Muslims in South Asia. Among many others, one was the Jamiat-i Ulema-i-Hind (JUH), which advocated "composite nationalism" that envisioned Hindu-Muslim unity within a single Indian nation. On the other hand, Jamaat-i-Islami rejected both secular nationalism and territorial identity in favor of a transnational Islamic polity (Zaman, 2002). There were other movements, too. For instance, the splinter group that would become Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam attempted to reconcile Islamic with the Muslim League's vision of a separate homeland. In subsequent years, these competing and conflicting doctrinal positions on nationalism proved determinative of which movement would be integrated into the state.

Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI)

A traditionalist movement rooted in Deobandi theology, JUI's integration into the Pakistani state is puzzling on standard accounts. Its success stemmed not from theological modernization but from its doctrinal accommodation of territorial nationalism. Before 1945 part of the Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind, JUI broke away when Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani rejected that organization's composite nationalism and aligned instead with the Muslim League's demand for Pakistan. This split was fundamentally doctrinal (Hameed, 2024).

Doctrinal Position on Territorial Nationalism

To reconcile Islamic principles with Pakistan's territorial nationalism, the JUI introduced a specific theological innovation: it accepted territorial boundaries and redefined nationhood as religious rather than ethnic. It declared that Indian Muslims constituted a distinct nation based on "the righteous principles of the Islamic Millat and Shariat and not on the basis of race, color, or geography" (*Star of India*, 1945) JUI's position challenged both the proponents of secular nationalism and the idea of composite Indian nationalism (Muttahida Qaumiyat) advocated by the JUH. Usmani argued that Islam provided the final and definitive classification of humanity into just two nations: the Muslim community (momin) that accepted Islamic teachings, and those who did not (kafir). He stressed that this binary division superseded all other bases of human categorization, such as homeland (watan), race (nasl), language (zabaan), or civilization (tamaddun) (Hamara Pakistan, 1946).

After offering an Islamic defense of territorial nationalism, Usmani further presented an Islamic jurisprudential justification for cooperating with the Muslim League's secular leadership. He cited classical Islamic scholars such as Ibn-i-Hasan Shaybani to argue that Muslims were permitted to ally with less-than-ideal allies against common enemies. It was a genuine theological innovation rather than mere political opportunism (Hameed, 2024). Usmani explained that his decision to support the ML came after 'prolonged deliberation, prayer, and a close reading of the Quran, the Sunnat, and Hanafi law' (Dhulipala, 2008). The focus on religiously inspired reasons was crucial because it provided Islamic legitimacy to an alliance with a secular political organization. This doctrinal flexibility distinguished JUI from other ulema movements that rejected any accommodation with secular nationalism.

Alliance Behavior During Independence

After developing what I call doctrinal compatibility, JUI was able to forge working alliances with the Muslim League leadership that most other religious movements could not. Jinnah lacked Islamic credentials and faced criticism from religious scholars and none other than the leadership of JUI came in defense of the ML leader. During the Pakistan movement, one of the JUI's core contributions was its persistent defense of ML leadership. Usmani carefully acknowledged that Jinnah, like other humans, had personal flaws and that some leaders exhibited questionable

moral conduct (Dhulipala, 2008). However, he also highlighted Jinnah's strengths, particularly his integrity and unwavering leadership. The argument was made that the ML was likely founded as a problematic group, but over time, it has evolved into a strong political organization worthy of representing the interests of Muslims (Dhulipala, 2008; Zaman, 2002). The JUI leadership's defense of Jinnah was crucial, as it helped the ML gain the support of traditional Muslims who otherwise would have opposed it.

During the 1945 elections, JUI deployed 24 clerics (ulema) across the United Provinces to campaign for the ML. This was the practical manifestation of the alliance between JUI and ML and demonstrated the latter's ability to leverage traditional religious authority for political purposes (Star of India, 1945). JUI's ability to mobilize traditional Muslims for the ML revealed the following: first, JUI proved itself an asset for the secular elite leading the project of independent Pakistan; second, it was clear that JUI is a partner in nation-building rather than a threat to secular elites; finally, ML could rely on the JUI and seek support of a large number of Muslims who listened to the later. Hence, the nationalism it projected was not revolutionary. Usmani compared this evolution to the gradual transition from night to day, and acknowledged that Pakistan would be "a step in the direction of our national health (qaumi sehat)... but a gradual step (tadriji kadam)" (Hamara Pakistan, 1946).

Integration into State Structures

Following independence in 1947, the JUI's alliance with the Muslim League facilitated high-level institutional integration. Though JUI kept focus on creating an Islamic constitutional order in the newly created state, it was able to differentiate itself from other Islamist groups, which either did not have access to the state or were actively marginalized by the state authorities. The fact that Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani was both the JUI's president and a Muslim League-nominated member of the Constituent Assembly, reveals how closely the integration was. Important to point out that Usmani was nominated precisely because of the religious authority and organizational standing he commanded as JUI's leader. The ticket was the vehicle; the alliance was the cause. As Hameed (2024) documents, the Muslim League leveraged Usmani's organizational standing, advertising his endorsements in election posters across northern India, inviting him to chair League sessions, and dispatching him to campaign in the

Northwest Frontier Province, precisely because his religious authority was what the League needed and JUI's organizational network was what delivered it. The ML also granted Usmani the honorific title of "Sheikh Al-Islam," which further legitimized his role as a bridge between the religious establishment and state institutions. The state's official recognition of the Usmani created anxiety among other religious groups that lacked such access (Parveen, 2010). Through these nominations and presence in the constituent assembly, JUI was able to influence constitutional debates from both within and outside the formal legislative structures.

During the debates surrounding the Objectives Resolution in 1949, the JUI leveraged its position to shape Pakistan's constitutional character. Minority representatives confronted the lawmakers and clerics regarding the state's religious orientation. Usmani manifested political acumen. He presented Jinnah’s 1945 letter to Pir Sahib of Manki Sharif, which had promised Islamic-compatible legislation through a Muslim-majority Constituent Assembly. Usmani also worked in concert with other influential religious figures, such as the Pir of Manki Sharif and Maulana Akram Khan, to "constantly urge the Government to declare Pakistan an Islamic state and to base the future constitution on Islamic principles" (Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, 1949). The efforts were successful, as the Usmani-led groups secured a declaration of divine sovereignty in the 1949 Objective Resolution. The Resolution established a constitutional precedent that shaped Pakistan's legal framework for decades. The fact that JUI co-authored rather than merely preserved these provisions directly contradicts accounts that treat Pakistani religious actors as post-hoc preservers of a constitutional order others had built (Nelson, 2022).

However, the Objectives Resolution's passage did not end JUI's constitutional activism; in subsequent years, JUI joined with other religious organizations, including JI, in pressing for further Islamization through platforms such as the 22-Point demands of 1951 (Binder, 1961; Saif, 2021). The 22 Points collaboration is instructive precisely because it involved both movements pressing for identical constitutional goals through channels outside the formal Assembly, yet the state's response differed. JUI's participation in anti-Ahmadiyya riots was treated as the activism of an established stakeholder whose constitutional credentials were already on record; JI's participation was treated as pressure from an outside agitator (Government of Punjab, 1954; Nasr, 1996). The asymmetry is legible in the Munir Report itself: the Court of Inquiry treated JUI's leaders as witnesses whose learned opinions on Islamic governance merited extended

quotation and respectful engagement, while it described Jama'at-i-Islami's founder as a man who stood at Government House on 5th March 1953 "anticipating the whole system of administration to crumble down and expressing his glee," an outside agitator whose organization's avowed goal of seizing state power rendered even its religious arguments suspect (Government of Punjab, 1954, pp. 245–248).

Jamaat-i-Islami (JI)

Abul A'la Maududi founded JI in 1941 amidst intense political mobilization surrounding the question of Muslim political identity in British India. JI emerged on the political scene of the subcontinent right after one year of the Muslim League's 1940 Lahore Resolution, which clearly demanded a separate country, Pakistan, for Muslims. Unlike JUI, JI had a modernist Islamic ideology and substantial public influence but remained excluded from the state. An analysis of primary and secondary sources demonstrates that JI's rejection of territorial nationalism foreclosed the alliance-building that enabled JUI's ability to embed itself in the state. JI's leaders condemned all forms of nationalism, including even Islamic nationalism, as fundamentally un-Islamic. It impeded cooperation with Pakistan's architects during the pre- and post-independence eras.

Doctrinal Position on Territorial Nationalism

Maududi completely rejected the idea of territorial nationalism and declared it un-Islamic. His contention was that the origins of nationalism were rooted in racism and imperialism, and therefore, it should be actively opposed. Maududi apparently traced these "initial germs" to Aristotle's "race-worship" and his vision of all outsiders as barbarians (Iqtidar, 2021). In Masala-e-Qaumiyat, Maududi asserted that Islam has a unique philosophical program and that it is the duty of Muslims to disseminate its mission. For him, terms like "Muslim nationalist" or "Muslim communist" were not applicable to Muslims. He specifically noted at the conclusion of the essay: "It is improper use of the word Muslims for those who followed any other ideological movements." In his own words: "'Muslim Nationalist' and 'Muslim Communist' are as contradictory terms as 'Communist Fascist', and 'Socialist Capitalist', and 'Chaste Prostitute!'... One ultimate goal of Islam is a world state on which the claims of racial and national prejudices would be dismantled and all mankind incorporated in a cultural and political system, with equal

rights and equal opportunities for all… the greatest curse in the world, it is the greatest menace to human civilization; it makes man wolf to all other nations except his own" (Maududi, 1941).

Maududi extended his criticism to the Pakistan movement. He saw "no difference between the Congress and the League; both desired a secular state" (Ahmad, 2009). The Muslim League's incomplete commitment to Islam was what triggered his attention and subsequent opposition to the project of a new country for the Muslims. To him, the League's approach to mobilizing Muslim support was nothing more than opportunistic: "Calling the bluff of Muslim League leaders, who had continuously appealed to Islamic symbols to mobilize support for Pakistan" (Nasr, 1994). Maududi (1942) was so critical of the Muslim League that he branded it as a "party of the pagans" and warned that their vision would lead to the creation of "napakistan"---a profane land. This evidence indicates that JI's doctrinal rigidity made an alliance with Pakistan's founders almost impossible. Unlike the JUI, the JI rejected the very demands and principles of territorial nationalism advocated by secular nationalists.

Alliance Behavior During Independence

JI's doctrinal position prevented the alliance-building that characterized JUI's trajectory. JUI deployed ulema to support Muslim League campaigns; JI, on the contrary, actively opposed Pakistan's creation during the independence struggle. Maududi's decision to migrate to Pakistan in 1947 and subsequently campaign for an Islamic constitution has sometimes been read as a post-hoc accommodation of territorial nationalism parallel to JUI's pre-independence position (Nasr, 1994). This reading conflates two analytically distinct moves. JUI's Usmani issued authoritative religious rulings declaring support for Pakistan Islamically permissible before independence (Hameed, 2024), deployed ulema to campaign for the Muslim League, and forged an organizational alliance that translated into Constituent Assembly membership and constitutional co-authorship. Maududi moved to Pakistan to Islamize a state he had previously condemned, a campaign premised on the state's religious illegitimacy, not its endorsement. The difference is not merely one of timing; it is one of doctrinal posture. One movement provided religious legitimation for the nationalist project during its constitutive moment; the other sought to impose Islamic correction on a project it had declared un-Islamic. That both men ultimately sought an Islamic Pakistan does not collapse the analytical distinction.

Aware of its constrained position, JI pursued indirect political engagement after independence, supporting what it deemed "virtuous" candidates through voters councils (panchayats) rather than fielding its own. It showed reluctance to engage fully with conventional political processes (Nasr, 1994). In the early years, JI behaved more like a moral guardian than a practical political entity, and according to Nasr (1994), it remained "divided over the extent of the rights of its leader, its religious calling, and political agenda," producing significant internal debates over whether to prioritize religious teachings or political activism. Senior members like Masud Alam Nadwi and Abdul-Jabbar Ghazi opposed political involvement entirely, citing its corrupting effect on the movement's character as a "holy community."

Integration into State Structures

JI's ideological tension with the state had its ramifications. Along all three dimensions, JI failed to integrate. Its first major electoral endeavor in the 1951 Punjab elections produced only 200,000 votes across 37 constituencies (Nasr, 1994), and JI subsequently turned to confrontational pressure politics. After failing at the polls, JI attempted to employ confrontational pressure politics to influence state policy. During the anti-Ahmadiyya agitations of 1952-53, both JUI and JI participated in the Majlis-e-Amal (Council of Action): JUI's Abul Hasanat Mohammad Ahmad served as its president, while JI's Amin Ihsan Islahi served as vice president. The state's response was directed primarily at JI– Maududi, who was arrested, tried for treason, and sentenced to death, a sentence later commuted to imprisonment (Saeed, 2007). That both movements participated in the same agitation yet faced sharply different state responses illustrates the argument's core logic: JUI's founding-era integration had established it as a legitimate, if occasionally troublesome, stakeholder within the state's religious architecture, whereas JI entered the same episode already classified as an external agitator whose anti-nationalist founding record made its opposition politically dangerous rather than institutionally manageable (Government of Punjab, 1954; Nasr, 1996). The state's differential response to organizationally similar behavior is precisely what the path-dependence argument predicts.

Islamic Movements in Colonial Indonesia

The intensified colonial control in Indonesia and religious leaders' exposure to Mecca, transformed Muslim politics, religious thought, and patterns of ideological mobilization. Dutch colonial policy was clear: it permitted neutral or apolitical religious activity but completely banned any political role for religious movements. Political Islam was suppressed in all forms by the colonizers (Noer, 1973). This “ethical policy,” which allowed Islamic reformist movements to focus on building organizational structures and training their followers along ideological lines, helped them develop infrastructure through educational, social welfare, and publishing activities. This supposed nonpolitical activity helped them to grow without triggering colonial regression (Azra, 2004). Muslim leaders at the start of the 20th century in colonized Indonesia saw various challenges, including Dutch colonialism, Christian missionary activity, and an apparent decline of authentic Islamic practice through syncretism with local traditions. Their duty was to articulate Islam's role in modern society and to actively pursue it. At the same time, reform ideas were spreading from South Asia and the Middle East into Southeast Asia, thereby intensifying the reform project.

Muhammadiyah

Ahmad Dahlan went for his first pilgrimage (hajj) to Mecca at the start of the 20th century, which exposed him to reformist ideas circulating there. Upon his return, on November 18, 1912, he established Muhammadiyah in Yogyakarta. Dahlan's interactions with members of Budi Utomo, an elite Javanese cultural and educational association widely regarded as Indonesia's first modern nationalist organization, also influenced the emergence of Muhammadiyah. At the beginning, Muhammadiyah was an "apolitical" Islamic reform movement focused on education and social welfare. How could it achieve level integration with the state or play an important role in the state formation in the 1940s? Its high integration stemmed not from explicit political mobilization but from doctrinal compatibility with territorial nationalism (Persyarikatan Muhammadiyah, 2024).

Doctrinal Position on Territorial Nationalism

Ahmad Dahlan’s vision about the origin of humanity proved crucial for the doctrinal framework that Muhammadiyah developed. He argued that there are two fundamental principles: the common origin of humans from Adam and Eve, and the necessity of transcending worldly

attachments for societal well-being (Idris, 1975). Such a broad notion of humanity's origin and desire to transcend worldly attachments offered space for accommodating modern nationalist aspirations. Some of Muhammadiyah's modernist principles included scripturalism, a focus on a direct return to the Qur'an and Hadith, and anti-syncretism, which criticized practices viewed as un-Islamic accretions. It also advocated for independent reasoning (ijtihad), and a holistic conception of Islam that offers comprehensive guidance for all aspects of life. Based upon these guiding principles, Muhammadiyah viewed religious reform as inseparable from broader social transformation and modernization. Such broad modernist ideas permitted Indonesian Muslims to fight for territorial nationalism without compromising their Islamic identity. In other words, Muhammadiyah's interpretation of Islam provided the moral framework for national unity rather than opposing it.

At the organizational level, Muhammadiyah maintained a strategic political neutrality while allowing individual members to engage in nationalist politics. According to Robert Van Niel (1960, 110), "[Ahmad Dahlan] remained in close contact with the Sarekat Islam but devoted most of his attention to the Muhammadiyah, which carefully refrained from all political activity"(Van Niel, 1960) The organization's immediate focus was on cultural and educational development, yet it maintained an ambiguous relationship with nationalist projects by collaborating with political organizations. Muhammadiyah carefully navigated the colonial policy of maintaining political neutrality while building the foundations of nationalist consciousness in Indonesia. French scholar G.H. Bousquet warned that "the Dutch administration was not sufficiently cognizant of the dangers inherent in the Muslim educational association"(Von Der Mehden, 1963). This warning underscored the fact that Muhammadiyah's apparent apolitical focus on education and social reform served as a powerful vehicle for nationalist awakening.

Alliance Behavior During Independence

Muhammadiyah was doctrinally compatible with the nationalist project; the next question was how it formed alliances with nationalist elites. It established an organizational framework with a written constitution and a structured membership system, which had grown to 4,000 members by 1925. Education was the cornerstone of their reform strategy, with "an impressive network of 55

schools serving 4,000 students" by the same year (Federspiel, 1970). Dahlan's religious outreach (tabligh) was successful and had a tremendous impact. People submitted requests to establish Muhammadiyah branches across Java. To expand its sphere of influence, the movement extensively published various magazines that outlined its theological positions and social vision. In the early phases, although Muhammadiyah focused on educational and philanthropic work, it was also building strong networks of educated Muslims who would play crucial roles in the independence movement in later years.

Fogg argues that "given Dutch policy that discouraged and suppressed political Islam while allowing or encouraging a more cultural practice of religion, their apolitical stance safeguarded the continued existence of Islamic organizations" (Fogg, 2020). Fogg also notes that Muhammadiyah's institutional infrastructure became directly involved in the independence struggle during the Japanese occupation and subsequent revolution, Moreover, Muhammadiyah created Hizbul Wathan which was a scouting organization that provided structure and training for youth and would later transform into a crucial instrument for the independence struggle. The scouting organization "easily transitioned into Islamic militias to fight off the Dutch" and merged religious conviction with nationalist resistance, with an assurance to the fighters that those who would die fighting on Indonesia's side would be martyrs (Fogg, 2020) Muhammadiyah successfully combined Islamic conviction and territorial nationalism, framing the independence struggle in religious terms. Muhammadiyah demonstrated its ability to mobilize mass support for the nationalist project on religious grounds, thereby establishing it as a reliable partner for secular nationalist leaders.

Integration into State Structures

Muhammadiyah’s doctrinal compatibility and subsequent alliance with the secular nationalist elites proved its multidimensional integration. Through both institutional engagement and mass mobilization during the revolutionary period and the early years of independence, it played a key role in constituting the Indonesian state. As one of the major "extraordinary members" of Masjumi, the largest Islamic political party in early independent Indonesia, Muhammadiyah contributed to the establishment of key state institutions, particularly the Ministry of Religion. At the ministry, its influence became a matter of intense competition with other Islamic movements (Noer, 1987). During deliberations on the Jakarta Charter, Muhammadiyah’s historical

legitimacy enabled it to participate. Though the constitutional struggle was not won, that does not mean it lacked integration with the state.

Apart from direct involvement in constitutional deliberations, Muhammadiyah contributed to state-building through other avenues, such as electoral politics, which provided it with another crucial avenue. Through its close alignment with Masjumi in the 1950s, during Indonesia's first democratic elections in 1955, Muhammadiyah proved instrumental in mobilizing voters, becoming "indistinguishable from Masjumi in some regions" (Fogg, 2020). The electoral capacity demonstrated popular legitimacy, complementing institutional access to Muhammadiyah and establishing it as both a civil society organization and a key political actor.

Persatuan Islam (Persis)

In 1923, a group of Muslim merchants, primarily from three families, founded Persis (Islamic Union—Persis) in Bandung, Indonesia. It shared Muhammadiyah's modernist theological orientation, operated educational institutions, and trained influential Islamic scholars. However, it achieved only individual level rather than organizational integration. Individual members like Mohammad Natsir (Prime Minister, 1950–1951) attained high positions, but the organization itself secured no formal institutional recognition. As with JI, doctrinal incompatibility with territorial nationalism explains this divergence. Unlike Muhammadiyah, which had reconciled Islamic reform with Indonesian nationalism, the leader of Persis, Ahmad Hassan, maintained that loyalty to the global Muslim community (*ummah)* must supersede territorial attachments.

Doctrinal Position on Territorial Nationalism

Ahmad Hassan argued that while there was no prohibition of loving one's country in Islam, a Muslim's highest loyalty should be to the ummah. For him, nationalists were insincere in their approach and Muslims should, therefore, not ally with them: "Beware of those who only profess the role of a Muslim when meeting believers, but who, after departing, tighten their lips out of hatred for us because we do not favor their principles of nationalism" (1940). Hassan and other Persis activists actively opposed the nationalist movement and also the symbols of nationalism. The argument was that languages, anthems, and the reverence of nationalist leaders could lead to idolatry, which is a concept deeply opposed to Islamic theology. Hassan equated these symbols with how pre-Islamic Arabs had worshipped idols: "First they build statues commemorating

people, then the statues become places of respect, later they become places for paying homage, and not long after there are those who believe [the statues] to be God" (Hassan, 1940).

There were also concerns regarding the nationalists' preference for secular governance. Hassan, for example, argued that Muslim leaders like Kemal Atatürk in Turkey and Reza Shah in Iran weakened their societies by sidelining Islam. He argued that it was nationalism that caused their moral decay: "Brandy, adultery, gambling, and other sins are widespread, even to the extent of actually being permissible" (Hassan, 1940) As a result of this rigid ideological position, Persis was unable to endorse Indonesian territorial nationalism or urge its followers to cooperate with secular nationalist leaders. The prerequisite for alliance-building was missing in the first place. It is important to clarify that Persis' theological foundations closely paralleled Muhammadiyah's modernist orientation, but on the question of nationalism, they differed, a distinction that proved decisive for integration during the era of state formation.

Alliance Behavior During Independence

Persis' relationship with the nationalist movement was intensely problematic. Its activists like Sabirin, Natsir, and Fachruddin al-Kahiri challenged nationalist leaders such as Soetomo and Soekarno for their refusal to recognize Islam's political role and for rejecting religious law as the foundation for Indonesian society. The nationalist leaders were challenged through various written exchanges in publications like *Islamic Defender* (Pembela Islam) and *The Voice*. Fachroeddin al-Kahiri's argued that as long as Indonesian Muslims prioritized national freedom over Muslim unity and considered politics more important than worship, Indonesian independence would remain "only a phrase on the lips" (Federspiel, 2001)

The movement had a more ambiguous and complex turn during the Japanese occupation (1942-1945). Although it remained inactive, some of its members, such as Moehammad Isa Anshary, who served in the Secretariat of MIAI, the High Islamic Council of Indonesia, and later Masjoemi, were engaged in low-level nationalist underground activities. Anshary was also briefly imprisoned in 1944 for organizing anti-Japanese youth activities. Similarly, Moehammad Natsir worked as an educational adviser in the Greater Bandung area and helped organize training programs for religious scholars. Those programs, while officially focused on Japanese ideas, provided opportunities for discussions about promoting Islam among the general Muslim

population (Noer, 1960). Overall, the movement at the organizational level remained inactive and did not face independence struggles comparable to those of Muhammadiyah's Hizbul Wathan militias.

Persis' core ideas, which emphasized Islamic identity as a prerequisite for Indonesian nationalism, remained intact. Over time, it evolved in a way that did not completely reject nationalism; rather, they argued that it had validity only when harnessed to the Islamic identity of the people. Activists associated with Persis believed that Dutch rule would naturally end if Indonesians fully identified with Islam and strictly adhered to its teachings. According to them, because of the true practice of Islam, a new Muslim state would emerge to provide both earthly and spiritual guidance. This position was widely shared with other pan-Islamist movements across the Muslim world, where colonial power was in control. Persis argued that Indonesian nationalism only had validity "when harnessed to the Islamic identity of the people," which meant full Islamic implementation should precede rather than follow independence (Wildan, 1995). Unlike Muhammadiyah's pro-nationalist position, Persis' pan-Islamist ideas did not allow it to claim credit as a co-founder of Indonesian nationalism, as Muhammadiyah could.

Integration into State Structures

Persis could influence the state and its policies primarily through individual members rather than through the organization itself, resulting in a distinct, lower level of integration. The case of Moehammad Natsir explains this fundamental difference. He secured the Prime Ministership (1950-1951) and the Masjumi chairmanship, which might superficially suggest high integration. However, a closer and careful examination reveals that Natsir operated as an individual statesman rather than as Persis' organizational representative. Unlike JUI's Usmani in Pakistan or Muhammadiyah's representatives in Indonesia's Ministry of Religion, Natsir's advancement did not translate into institutional recognition or resources for Persis' as an organization. This is what I call "individual integration" rather than organizational embeddedness. The pattern of indirect influence extended to other members like Moehammad Isa Anshary, who served in parliament and the Constituent Assembly, and also maintained positions on Masjumi's leadership council (Noer,1960), and Ahmad Hassan contributed to Masjumi's Legal Council (Madjelis Sjuro) and various government religious advisory bodies. Despite achieving individual integration, Persis as

an organization remained excluded. For instance, it did not receive any of the institutional appointments, educational authority, or even official recognition that characterized Muhammadiyah's integration in Indonesia or JUI's in Pakistan. The question of integration and recognition had practical implications for resource allocation. For instance, Muhammadiyah schools received state funding and recognition within the national educational framework, but Persis' educational institutions remained independent and self-financed (Noer, 1960*)*.

Conclusion

The comparative analysis demonstrates that doctrinal positions on territorial nationalism during anti-colonial struggles determined integration into postcolonial states (see Table 2). Movements that reconciled Islamic principles with territorial nationalism forged founding-era alliances that translated into durable institutional co-authorship; movements that opposed it remained excluded despite subsequent adaptation.

Table 2: Controlled Comparison of Islamic Movements

Variable	**Pakistan** **JUI vs. JI**	**Indonesia** **Muhammadiyah vs. Persis**
Institutional Origins & Intellectual Heritage	**Shared:** Shared institutional inheritance: both emerged from the Deobandi tradition: diverging in theological elaboration but not in organizational form or scholarly lineage	**Shared:** Both modernist reformist, both oppose syncretic practices, both emphasize ijtihad over taqlid
Organizational Capacity	**Comparable:** Both operate madrasa/school networks, both mobilize mass support, both publish religious materials	**Comparable:** Both establish modern educational institutions, both publish reform journals, both maintain formal organizational structures

Doctrinal Position on Territorial Nationalism	**Different:** • JUI: Compatible (theological justification for Pakistan) • JI: Incompatible (rejected territorial nationalism as un-Islamic)	**Different:** • Muhammadiyah: Compatible (accommodated Indonesian nationalism within Islamic framework) • **Persis**: Incompatible (prioritized pan-Islamic unity over territorial boundaries)
State Integration Outcome	**Different:** • JUI: High (constitutional authority, official positions) • JI: Low (excluded from state institutions during formative period)	**Different:** • Muhammadiyah: High (Ministry of Religion, educational authority, Masjumi representation) • Persatuan Islam: Low-Medium (individual achievements, limited organizational access)

The mechanisms identified here operate in contexts in which territorial boundaries are contested during decolonization, movements possess organizational capacity, and state formation occurs at critical junctures. Contemporary patterns suggest broader applicability, but they demand careful specification. In India, the RSS and Bharatiya Janata Party's success stems partly from developing a Hindu nationalist doctrine compatible with Indian territorial nationalism, framing Hindutva as coterminous with Indian national identity, parallel to JUI's reconciliation of Islam with Pakistani nationalism. In contemporary Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama's continued integration reflects the doctrinal compatibility established during the independence period, whereas Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia's 2017 ban followed its advocacy of a transnational caliphate over territorial nationalism, echoing Persis' marginalization. Whether these mechanisms operate across non-Muslim contexts requires systematic investigation, Islam's ummah versus territorial belonging tension may create dynamics distinct from other religious traditions.

There are several directions for future research: Do Christian movements in postcolonial Africa, Hindu movements in South Asia, or Buddhist movements in Southeast Asia exhibit comparable patterns in which doctrinal positions on territorial nationalism during independence determined integration? This requires identifying cases in which territorial nationalism was contested during decolonization, and in which religious movements of sufficient organizational capacity took positions on the religious legitimacy of nationalism. Future work should specify under what conditions initially excluded movements overcome structural disadvantages.

Adeed

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